In The Consolation, Boethius' highest level is unity with God, whom he defines as universally good, omnipotent, and omniscient. Boethius' immediate circumstance, however, stands in stark contrast to that unity. Boethius at the writing of The Consolation is a dedicated public servant and advocate for justice and right who has been accused of treason and unjustly imprisoned. To be successful, The Consolation must rise up from unjustly accused and imprisoned Boethius and reach to an omnipotent and omniscient God whose purposes and plans are universally good, and it must do so in logical inclusive steps.
Perhaps partly due to severe political strictures upon Christian thought, Boethius elects to move his composition along in the classical element. He refers to the pagan deities by name and accords them their domain and significance. His personal circumstance as a prisoner makes this decision significant, particularly in view of the many early Christian stories of miraculous release from just such imprisonment. For example, the story of Paul and Silas imprisoned in Rome might have been familiar to Boethius. In that story, Paul and Silas were seized for causing trouble and teaching strange customs, then beaten and imprisoned (Acts 16:21).
25 And at midnight Paul and Silas prayed and sang praises unto God: and the prisoners heard them.26 And suddenly there was a great earthquake, so that the foundations of the prison were shaken: and immediately all the doors were opened, and every one's bands were loosed.
27 And the keeper of the prison awaking out of his sleep, and seeing the prison doors open, he drew out his sword, and would have killed himself, supposing that the prisoners had been fled.
28 But Paul cried with a loud voice, saying, Do thyself no harm: for we are all here.
29 Then he called for a light, and sprang in, and came trembling, and fell down before Paul and Silas,
30 And brought them out, and said, Sirs, what must I do to be saved? (Acts 16:25-30, KJV)
Boethius in his own similar distress does not call upon the God of Paul, nor does he expect the miracle. He trusts his experience that prison doors do not open and jailers do not bow down to prisoners. He calls instead upon Lady Philosophy to assist him in understanding his misfortune.
Lady Philosophy is an allegorical figure who fits within in the most narrowly defined classical tradition. She wears a robe with a lower border of the Greek letter pi and a top border of the letter theta. (36) These borders, connected as they were by a ladder, reveal the allegorical nature of Lady Philosophy. They designated for Boethius natural science, i.e., observed human reality at the lowest level and God or moral philosophy at the highest.
Lady Philosophy is changeable in size, as were the classical deities when they appeared upon the human plane in legend. Sometimes she appears of average human size, and sometimes she raises herself up so that her head is invisible, piercing the sky. (35-36) Of particular note is the fact that she is female. Greek and Roman pantheons included powerful and wise goddesses, whereas the Christian religion embodies the female aspect of deity in Mary, whose status is somewhat below actual deity. Lady Philosophy does not reflect the Virgin Mary in any way except in her sympathy for Boethius' suffering and her tender treatment toward him. The compassion of Lady Philosophy is expressed not in prayer or intercession for Boethius, which would have been Marian, but in the metaphor of the healing art, which even today retains more classical than Christian character.
The metaphor of healing is constant throughout The Consolation. The diagnosis of the disease is specific, and it involves a basic philosophical assumption of the existence of the individual soul prior to and apart from the body. This idea is not entirely unknown in Christian doctrine, but it is not orthodox or Augustinian. It was, however, familiar in classical thought and thoroughly treated by Plato. The illness from which Boethius is suffering stems, according to Lady Philosophy, from his forgetting his divine origin and nature. She proposes to return him to remembrance and to health by leading him in the accustomed logical ascent to the truth.
Lady Philosophy's first step is to banish the sentimental Muses who attend Boethius. (36) Plato likewise barred self-indulgent and sentimental poetry from his Republic, observing that participation degrades the spirit of man, "feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue." (Republic, 433)
Boethius' idea of divinity is closer to Plato's than to Paul's or to Augustine's. It cannot be stated, however, that his God is incompatible with the Christian God. Boethius avoids offense to the Christian faith, even at the cost of simply not talking about the one subject upon which extension of his philosophy would offend both Paul and Augustine, the question of eternal punishment for evil. For Augustine, eternal suffering balances the scales for participation in evil and denial of God, and Augustine accurately reflects Paul in this perception. Boethius, however, offers a different picture of the ultimate outcome of evil, one that has more similarity to the pagan world view than to any orthodox Christian view. Regarding punishment of the soul after the death of the body, Lady Philosophy states:
There is, indeed, great punishment then, sometimes exacted with penal severity, sometimes, I think, with purifying mercy; but it is not my intention to discuss it now. (129)
... desire for true good is planted by nature in the minds of men, only error leads them astray towards false good. (79)
... it is not difficult to show the hand of nature in this, since in spite of the variety and difference of their opinions, men are agreed in their choice of the good as their goal. (81)
Having assented to the divine nature and the resultant universality of good intent, she asserts that when something acts against its own nature, it ceases to exist at all, so that:
... if you say they abandon goodness and turn to vice knowingly and willingly, this way they not only cease to be powerful, but cease to be at all. Men who give up the common goal of all things that exist, thereby cease to exist themselves ... I am not trying to deny the wickedness of the wicked; what I do deny is that their existence is absolute and complete existence ... A thing exists when it keeps its proper place and preserves its own nature. Anything which departs from this ceases to exist, because its existence depends on the preservation of its nature. (121-122)
Given this definition, there could be no population of human souls for the Augustinian hell. Boethius certainly knew the writings of Augustine, who was the dominant voice Christian of orthodoxy as Bishop of Hippo from 395 to 426 CE, and he could not fail to be familiar with Augustine's conception of "the devil and his body...destined to go with him into the punishment of everlasting fire." (Augustine, 673) In the words of Lady Philosophy, Boethius asserts that the existence of this body is not "absolute and complete existence." If Lady Philosophy addresses this question in any greater detail, she would likely offend either logic or orthodoxy, and Boethius allows her to leave the topic.
The interplay of classical and Christian elements evident in Boethius' work is a compelling aspect of the study. It invites speculation upon authorial intent and directs attention to the history of interpretation of The Consolation over centuries of use. Comparing three translations of part of one poem demonstrates the interplay and reveals the range of interpretation possible within the text. This range of interpretation is part of its success and may have been necessary to its survival in the political context in which it was created. The three translations quoted are the Penguin Classics translation by V.E. Watts (1969), the Modern Library translation by W. V. Cooper (1943), and the translation by Geofrey Chaucer (c 1375).
In the Penguin Classics translation by V.E. Watts, Lady Philosophy promises to provide wings upon which Boethius' mind can ascend:
Until it rises to the stars,
With Phoebus there to join its ways,
Or Saturn cold accompany
As soldier of his shining rays ...
It treads beneath the ether swift
Possessing now the holy light,
For here the King of kings holds sway,
The reins of all things holding tight,
Unmoving moves the chariot fast,
The lord of all things shining bright.( 117)
In the Modern Library translation by W. V. Cooper:
... until she rises to the stars' own home, and joins her path unto the sun's; or accompanies on her path the cold and ancient Saturn, maybe as the shining warrior Mars; or she may take her course through the circle of every star that decks the night ... And when she has had her fill of journeying, then may she leave the sky and tread the outer plane of the swift moving air, as mistress of the awful light. Here holds the King of Kings His sway, and guides the reins of the universe, and Himself unmoved He drives His winged chariot, the bright disposer of the world. (75)
And in the translation by Geofrey Chaucer:
... til that he areyseth hym into the houses that beren the sterres, and joyneth his weies with the sonne, Phebus, and felawschipeth the weie of the olde colde Saturnus; and he, imaked a knight of the clere sterre (that is to seyn, whan the thought is makid Godis knight by the sekynge of trouthe to comen to the verray knowleche of God) -- and thilke sould renneth by the cercle of the sterres in all the places there as the schynynge nyght is ypainted (that is to sey, the nyght that is cloudeles; for on nyghtes that ben cloudles it semeth as the hevene were peynted with diverse ymages of sterres). And whan [that] he hath gon there inoghe, he schal forleten the laste point of the hevene, and he schal presen and wenden on the bak of the swifte firmament, and he schal be makid parfit of the worschipful lyght [or] dredefulle clerenesse of God. There halt the lord of kynges the septre of his myght and atemprith the governementz of the world, and the schynynge judge of thinges, stable in hymself, governeth the swifte cart or wayn (that is to seyn, the circuler moevynge of the sonne). (440)
In the newest translation, there are more direct mentions of the names of the Greek deities in contexts that accord them their ancient recognized domains. Phoebus drives the chariot of the Sun, and is in fact the Sun. Saturn is his cold and distant companion. "King of kings," a common Christian reference to Christ, refers in this reading directly to Phoebus, who " The reins of all things holding tight, / Unmoving moves the chariot fast, / The lord of all things shining bright." (Watts, 117).
Cooper, in the Modern Library translation, elides much of the imagery of Watts by failing to give Phoebus his name at the same point in the text. Momentarily the classical reference is lost to a scientific understanding of the sun as the sun and Saturn as a planet. However, Cooper reverts, again without naming him, to reference to the sun-god driving his chariot, "Here holds the King of Kings His sway, and guides the reins of the universe, and Himself unmoved He drives His winged chariot, the bright disposer of the world." (Cooper, 79). Capitalizations on the pronouns are a common Christian custom in writing about God. They fit well enough with the King of Kings reference, but hardly belong with the winged chariot. It is, however, possible, in this translation, to miss the classical allusion entirely unless the reader is observant and knows Greek or Roman mythology and the historical context of Boethius.
To translate pagan references, Chaucer inserts parenthetical notes to move the text from pagan to Christian, explaining precisely how the pagan references should be viewed in the Christian perspective. He gives his reader the name of Phoebus, but in "the schynynge judge of thinges, stable in hymself, governeth the swifte cart or wayn (that is to seyn, the circuler moevynge of the sonne)" (440) the parenthetical note instructs the reader to consider this a reference to the motion of the sun, and not to the Greek god. To Boethius, the distinction may have been moot, for in the Watts translation, Phoebus is the sun.
The question upon looking at these three translations relates to the comparative influence of Christian orthodoxy at the time of each translation upon the translators' treatment of the original text. The text and its many interpretations leave open the question of precisely what Boethius' final thoughts were on Christianity, despite the clear historical acceptance of his work into the lexicon of early Christian writers.
Significant also to this question is the fact that Boethius feels that he should pray to God, implying a personal and interested deity. Yet he refers the idea to Plato rather than Christ, in the words of Lady Philosophy:
"But since in the Timaeus my servant Plato was pleased to ask for divine help even over small matters, what do you think we ought to do now in order to be worthy of discovering the source of that supreme good?""We ought to pray to the Father of all things. To omit to do so would not be laying a proper foundation."
"Right," she said, ... (97)
After this exchange between the character Boethius and Lady Philosophy, Boethius inserts a hymn of prayer which, even in the Watt translation, contains no classical allusion that could not be interpreted as equally appropriate to Christian thought. Still, it is not a prayer of Paul or Augustine. It does not pray for deliverance from or victory over evil. It prays only to be able to have sight and knowledge of the good. It does not complain of the world's evil and chaos, but praises the order that embraces all created things in their places.
If happiness is the highest good of rational nature and anything that can be taken away is not the highest good -- since it is surpassed by what can't be taken away -- Fortune by her very mutability can't hope to lead to happiness. (63).
In Book III, he learns that wrong is done in error, for "the mind seeks its own good, though like a drunkard it cannot find the path home." (80) Book IV outlines the reward of true good as well as the reward of evil:
The reward of the good, then, a reward that can never be decreased, that no one's power can diminish, and no one's wickedness darken, is to become gods. This being so, no wise man can be in any doubt of the inevitability of the punishment of the wicked.... goodness itself is unity; from which it follows that we must see everything that exists as good. This means that anything which turns away from goodness ceases to exist, and thus that the wicked cease to be what they once were. That they used to be human is shown by the human appearance of their body which still remains. So it was by falling into wickedness that they also lost their human nature. (125)
And further:
...if you have turned your mind to higher things, there is no need of a judge to award a prize; it is you yourself who have brought yourself to a more excellent state; but if you have directed your zeal towards lower things, do not look for punishment from without; it is you yourself who have plunged yourself into the worse condition... (130)
Book IV is the pivotal point of the argument, for it is in Book IV that Philosophy ascends beyond the temporal level. She explains:
... the simple and unchanging plan of events is Providence, and Fate is the ever-changing web, the disposition in and through time of all the events which God has planned in His simplicity. (136)
She exemplifies this concept by a set of revolving concentric circles. Those things that are on the plane most distant from the center move more rapidly than those on each successive circle moving inward, with those nearest the center being least subject to the effects of the revolutions. God is the unmoving center:
Anything that joins itself to the middle circle is brought close to simplicity ... In the same way whatever moves any distance from the primary intelligence becomes enmeshed in ever stronger chains of Fate, and everything is the freer from Fate the closer it seeks the centre of things. (136)
The fifth and last book of The Consolation deals with the question of freedom of the will in the context of Providence, postulated as God's unchanging plan. The question arises in response to the definition of God as omniscient and addresses self-determination, which is in effect the question of whether there is any reason for a human being to take thought in the first place. After all, if God knows everything, he knows the future; if he knows the future, the future is sealed and nothing an individual can do will alter it. God cannot be thought to be less than omniscient. He would in that case lack knowledge, and having a lack of knowledge, he would not be perfect. Being imperfect, he would not be God. Lady Philosophy deals with the question in answer to Boethius' question:
"But is there room in this chain of close-knit causes for any freedom of the will? Or does the chain of Fate bind even the impulses of the human mind?""There is freedom," she said. "For it would be impossible for any rational nature to exist without it. Whatever by nature has the use of reason has the power of judgment to decide each matter ... Human souls are of necessity more free when they continue in the contemplation of the mind of God and less free when they descend to bodies, and less still when they are imprisoned in earthly flesh and blood. They reach an extremity of enslavement when they give themselves up to wickedness and lose possession of their proper reason ..." (149)
This statement affirms not only freedom of the will, but extension of such freedom beyond the boundaries of birth and death. The human soul which is continuing "in the contemplation of the mind of God" has the most freedom. Because a distinction is made between this state and that of being "imprisoned in earthly flesh and blood," it is obvious that Boethius means that a living human residing on earth between the events of birth and death is "imprisoned." Free will for that individual is at least three steps removed from optimum availability. That the soul lives in "the contemplation of the mind of God" does not mean "thinks about God." It is a different state of the existence of the soul, not contained between bodily birth and death. Freedom of the will is by this consideration both affirmed and denied to any living human being, i.e., one who has been born and has not died. The answer refers the affirmation of freedom of the will outside the context in which the question is asked. In fairness, it also refers the individual consciousness beyond the birth and death boundaries also, and the human will and its freedom can, in this view, at least potentially exist on the same plane.
Lady Philosophy also explains that God's foreknowledge is less limiting by reason of the fact that God is above and different from human beings, and his way of knowing is also different. She states, "Everything that is known is comprehended not according to its own nature, but according to the ability to know of those who do the knowing." (157) Since this knowing occurs in a plane outside the human perspective, free will is not restricted on the human plane of knowing, and moral responsibility is not mitigated. Her advice then, is familiar in both classical pagan and Christian contexts:
Avoid vice, therefore, and cultivate virtue; lift up your mind to the right kind of hope, and put forth humble prayers on high. A great necessity is laid upon you, if you will be honest with yourself, a great necessity to be good, since you live in the sight of a judge who sees all things. (168)
The Holy Bible, King James Version.
Augustine. On Christian Doctrine Trans. J.F. Shaw. Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 18. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952.
Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. W.V Cooper. New York: The Modern Library, Random House, 1943.
Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. V.E. Watts. New York: Penguin Classics, 1969. (Unless otherwise noted, all page references are from this edition.)
Boethius. Boece. Trans. Geofrey Chaucer. The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd ed. Boston: The Houghton Miffflin Company, 1987.
Plato. Republic. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 7. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952.